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Abstract
Training deep neural networks on images represented
as grids of pixels has brought to light an interesting phe-
nomenon known as adversarial examples. Inspired by how
humans reconstruct abstract concepts, we attempt to codify
the input bitmap image into a set of compact, interpretable
elements to avoid being fooled by the adversarial struc-
tures. We take the first step in this direction by experiment-
ing with image vectorization as an input transformation step
to map the adversarial examples back into the natural man-
ifold of MNIST handwritten digits. We compare our method
vs. state-of-the-art input transformations and further dis-
cuss the trade-offs between a hand-designed and a learned
transformation defense.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been shown to be ex-
tremely vulnerable to adversarial examples (AXs)—the in-
puts specifically optimized to fool them [38, 27]. An imper-
ceptible perturbation can be crafted such that when added
to the input of a deep image classifier would change its pre-
diction entirely [38]. These adversarial perturbations can be
as minute as one single pixel [37]; computed inexpensively
with a single backward pass through the DNN [11] or via
black-box optimization algorithms [7, 14, 29].
The inability to resist AXs is a general, task- and dataset-
agnostic weakness across most machine learning models
[1]. Importantly, AXs generated to fool one target model
transfers to fool other unknown models [29]. This poses
serious implications on the security and reliability of real-
world applications, especially the safety-critical domains
like autonomous driving.
Recent research suggests that the adversarial problem is
an artifact of classifiers being imperfectly trained i.e. hav-
ing a non-zero error on test data [9, 35]. However, perfect
generalization is impractical to obtain in real-world settings
where the input space is high-dimensional, and our mod-
∗This work was done during VMK’s internship at Auburn University.
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Figure 1: The top row shows the adversarial examples (b-f)
crafted for a real test image, here “3” (a) via state-of-the-
art crafting methods (top labels). The bottom row shows
the results of vectorizing the respective images in the row
above. Below each image are the predicted label and confi-
dence score from the classifier. All the attacks are targeted
to label “1” except for DeepFool (which is an untargeted at-
tack). Vectorization substantially washes out the adversarial
artifacts and pulls the images back to the correct labels. See
Sec. S8 for more examples.
els are trained to minimize the empirical risk over a limited
training set. Despite a large body of recent research, the
adversarial problem remains largely unsolved [1, 43]. A
state-of-the-art, effective defense mechanism is adversarial
training [23, 11]—directly training a model on both clean1
and adversarial examples—is not a general solution. Fur-
thermore, we wish the ideal defense layer to be (1) attack-
agnostic, and (2) model-agnostic (e.g. not having to alter or
impose additional constraints on an existing image classi-
fier).
In this paper, we explore harnessing vectorization (i.e.
image tracing) [33, 3]—a simple image transformation
method in computer graphics—for defending against AXs.
We refer to our method as VectorDefense. Specifically, we
1We use clean and real images interchangeably to refer to real dataset
examples (without any perturbations).
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Figure 2: The workflow of VectorDefense. Given a real image in the bitmap space (a), an attacker crafts an adversarial
example (b). Via vectorization (i.e. image tracing), we transform the input image (b) into a vector graphic (c) in SVG format,
which is an XML tree with geometric primitives such as contours and ovals. The vector graphic is then rasterized back to
bitmap (d) before being fed to a classifier for prediction. VectorDefense effectively washes out the adversarial artifacts and
pulls the perturbed image (b) back closer to the natural manifold (d).
transform each input bitmap image into a vector graphic im-
age (SVG format)—which is composed of simple geomet-
ric primitives (e.g. oval and stroke)—via Potrace [33], and
then rasterize it back into the bitmap form before feeding it
to the classifier (Fig. 2).
VectorDefense employs vectorization to smooth out the
adversarial perturbations, which are often minute, and lo-
cal at the pixel level (Fig. 1). Here, we attempt to decom-
pose (i.e. vectorize) an input image (e.g. a handwritten
digit “9”) into layers of compact, and interpretable elements
(e.g. a stroke and an oval in Fig. 2c) that are resolution-
independent. We therefore test vectorizing MNIST data,
which compose of simple stroke structures, to purify AXs
without having to re-train the classifiers.
We make the following contributions:
1. We show that VectorDefense is a viable input transfor-
mation defense to the problem of AXs. We validate our
hypothesis on (1) classifiers trained on MNIST [20];
(2) across 6 state-of-the-art attack methods; and (3) un-
der both white- and gray-box threat models (Sec. 4.2).
2. We compare and show that VectorDefense performs
competitively with state-of-the-art hand-designed in-
put transformation methods including bit-depth reduc-
tion [42] and image quilting [12] (Sec. 4.2).
3. We evaluate the effectiveness of input transformation
techniques over the number of pixels allowed to be
perturbed (i.e. a budget). That is, we propose budget-
aware variants of JSMA [30] and C&W L0 [5] that
craft an AX with a given budget. (Sec. 4.3).
4. We compare and contrast VectorDefense with
Defense-GAN [32], a state-of-the-art input transfor-
mation method with a learned prior. Interestingly, we
found that these two types of approaches can perform
distinctively in many cases (Sec. 4.5).
2. Adversarial Attacks and Defenses
Consider a classifier f(·) that attempts to predict a true
label y given an input image x . An AX is a slight pertur-
bation of an input, x′, such that f(x′) 6= y. The AX can
be made visually indistinguishable from the original image.
AX crafting algorithms can be also constrained by a norm
of the perturbation e.g. ‖ · ‖p [5].
In this paper, we evaluate our defense under two strong
threat models: white-box and gray-box (characterized by
the level of knowledge the adversary has about the victim).
White-box: the attacker has access to the network weights,
and also any defense method (here, the input transformation
layer). Gray-box: the attacker has access to the network
parameters, but not the defense method.
2.1. Attacks
Many methods for crafting adversarial examples have
been proposed [1]. We briefly describe the most relevant
gradient-based attacks, which we use to evaluate VectorDe-
fense (Sec. 4).
A computationally inexpensive procedure is the fast gra-
dient sign method (FGSM) [11]. This attack computes the
adversarial input through a single backward pass of the net-
work with respect to the input, amounting to a single-step
Figure 3: Given clean MNIST images (a) which are correctly classified with a label l (here, 0–9 respectively), we add
perturbations (b) to produce adversarial examples (c) that are misclassified as l + 1 (i.e. digit 0 is misclassified as 1, etc.)
via I-FGSM [19]. VectorDefense effectively purifies the adversarial perturbations in the final results (e), which are correctly
classified. Row (d) shows the difference between the original (a) vs. purified examples (e). Below each image we show its
predicted label and confidence score. See Sec. S8 for more examples of VectorDefense vs. other attack algorithms.
maximization of the loss function. If the classifier f(·) has
a differentiable loss function J(·, ·), calculating the adver-
sarial input is written as
x′ = x+  · sign(∇xJ(x, y)) (1)
where y is the true label and  determines the strength of
the attack (i.e. how much perturbation FGSM is allowed to
make). The process can be adapted to an iterative proce-
dure [19] that is more effective with less perturbation:
x(i+1) = clipx,(x
(i) + α · sign(∇x(i)J(x(i), y))) (2)
where x(0) = x is the original image. We refer to this adap-
tation as iterative fast gradient sign method (I-FGSM).
Each iteration, we take a step of size α in the adversarial
direction, always staying within  distance of the original
input, measured by the L∞ norm. That is, a cap is imposed
on the maximum perturbation that can be made at any pixel.
Optimization continues until the image is misclassified or
the maximum perturbation has been reached.
I-FGSM is similar to projected gradient descent (PGD)
attack [21] except that PGD starts from a random point
within an -norm ball.
Another gradient-based method is the Jacobian
Saliency Map Algorithm (JSMA) [30] which relies on the
saliency map computed from the backpropagation. The
saliency map shows how sensitive the network’s prediction
is to the input pixels. In each step, JSMA selects two pixels
to perturb, and repeats the process until a perturbation limit
is reached or the DNN prediction becomes incorrect.
The DeepFool algorithm [24] finds an AX by iteratively
projecting x onto a linearized approximation of the decision
boundary of classifier f(·). In each iteration, DeepFool per-
forms the below update:
x(i+1) = x(i) −  · f(x
(i))
‖∇x(i)f(x(i))‖22
∇x(i)f(x(i)) (3)
where again x(0) = x.
Carlini and Wagner (C&W) attack [6] instead uses
Adam optimizer [16] and incorporates a constraint on the
adversarial perturbation in three different ways: (1) limit-
ing the amount of changes in L2 distance from the original
image; (2) limiting the maximum amount of changes to any
pixel via L∞; (3) limiting the number of pixels that can be
perturbed (i.e. a budget) via L0.
To study the effectiveness of the input transformation de-
fenses over perturbation budget settings, we modify JSMA
and C&W L0 to take in an additional input parameter that
specifies the number of pixels that can be modified. We re-
fer to these algorithms as (1) Budget-aware JSMA and (2)
Budget-aware C&W L0 respectively:
• In every step, budget-aware JSMA selects a pair of
pixels to perturb until the budget limit is reached re-
gardless of whether the image is misclassified (i.e.
f(x′) 6= y).
• In contrast, budget-aware C&W L0 maintains a set of
all pixels that can be perturbed (initially the entire im-
age), and then iteratively shrinks this set until its size
equals a given budget. When it is not possible to find
an AX at the given budget, the original image is re-
turned.
2.2. Defenses
A number of defense strategies have been proposed to
stymie the effectiveness of adversarial perturbations [1].
Here we describe existing input transformation schemes
for later comparing with our VectorDefense. Input trans-
formation defenses seek to “purify” an AX i.e. removing
the adversarial perturbations (often small and local) while
maintaining the features necessary for correct classifica-
tions. Input transformations can be categorized into those
with hand-designed vs. learned priors.
Under hand-designed priors, many methods have been
proposed [1]. An effective technique is bit-depth reduction
[42], which reduces the degrees of perturbation freedom
within each pixel by quantizing the image. Image quilting
[12] instead replaces patches of an image with similar clean
patches extracted from a database.
There are input transformation defenses that instead har-
ness a learned prior in the form of Generative Adversarial
Networks (GANs) [32, 22, 34, 15], and PixelCNN [36].
Among those, we directly compare VectorDefense with
a state-of-the-art method called Defense-GAN [32], which
harnesses a GAN [10] to purify AXs. Basically, the idea is
similar to conditional iterative image generation techniques
[25, 26, 44]. First, we train a generator G(·) to map a latent
code z from a simple prior distribution (e.g. Gaussian) to
an image x in a target distribution (e.g. handwritten digits
in MNIST) which the classifier is also trained on. Then,
we search for a latent code z∗ such that the resulting im-
age matches a target (adversarial) image x i.e. G(z∗) ≈ x.
The final image found G(z∗) is then fed to the classifier for
prediction. Interestingly, this method is not completely ro-
bust. Since G is not guaranteed to be perfectly trained and
therefore, one can find AXs directly in the generated distri-
bution [2, 15]. Overall, these defenses, and others that do
not explicitly use input transformations, are still imperfect
at resisting AXs [4, 5, 2, 1].
This work explores a novel, intuitive method that trans-
lates an input image into contours and other simple geo-
metric shapes in an attempt to purify AXs. We view Vec-
torDefense as a stepping stone towards decomposing im-
ages into compact, interpretable elements to solve the ad-
versarial problem.
3. Methods
VectorDefense is an input transformation defense that
aims to remove the adversarial artifacts in an AX, while pre-
serving the class-specific features needed for classification.
Specifically, we utilize Potrace vectorization algorithm [33]
to translate an input bitmap image into a vector graphic.
Then we rasterize the vector graphic back to a bitmap before
classification (Fig. 2). We first describe Potrace (Sec. 3.1)
and then how the defense method works (Sec. 3.2).
3.1. The Potrace Algorithm
Potrace is an algorithm to convert a black-and-white
bitmap image (i.e. a binary image), into an algebraic de-
scription of its contours, typically in Be´zier curves [33].
Therefore, a vector image is often smooth-edged and does
not have pixelation effect (Fig. 2c vs. d). This description
is preferred in graphic design since it is scale-invariant. We
chose to experiment with Potrace because the algorithm is
simple, efficient and has been shown effective for handwrit-
ten images [33].
At a high level, the algorithm works by tracing polygons
onto the bitmap image based on intensity differences, then
optimizing curves to match the contours of those polygons
[33]. There are four steps in Potrace:
Step 1: An input bitmap image is decomposed into a set of
paths that are formed by drawing boundaries that separate
black and white regions.
Step 2: Potrace approximates each path found by a poly-
gon. The polygons are constructed with the constraints of
having the fewest number of edges while matching their re-
spective paths.
Step 3: Potrace transforms each polygon into a smooth vec-
tor outline (i.e. a set of contours).
Step 4: Potrace joins adjacent Be´zier curve segments to-
gether into a more compact vector file, though this often
has imperceptible visual effects on the final output.
3.2. Vectorization as a Defense
We describe the components of the VectorDefense
pipeline that are hypothesized to be effective in purifying
AXs.
Binarization Vectorization is an image tracing algorithm
based on a color palette [33]. Here, we choose to use only
black and white colors for tracing i.e. we binarize an im-
age first before feeding into Potrace. The intuition that bi-
narizing images effectively reduces the input space dimen-
sion where adversarial perturbations could be made has also
been confirmed in a concurrent work of bit-depth reduction
[42] (here, we reduce images into 1-bit).
DespecklingAn adversarial example often has many speck-
les i.e. small color blobs that are not part of the digit but
injected to fool the classifier (Fig. 1; top row). Despeckling
is an attempt to remove these speckles by dropping all the
paths (returned from step 1 in Potrace) that consists of fewer
than t pixels. We empirically find that t = 5 works the best
in removing adversarial speckles (Fig. 4).
(a) AX (b) 0 (c) 5 (d) 10 (e) 20
Figure 4: Despeckling removes small color blobs by drop-
ping all the paths that consists of fewer than t pixels. We
show the results of Potrace vectorization on an adversarial
example crafted by C&W L0 method [5] (a) with different
values of t = 0, 5, 10, 20. t = 0: no despeckling.
Smoothing Real handwritten digits often possess a large
amount of smoothness (Fig. 3a), which is corrupted by
adversarial perturbations (Fig. 3c). The steps 1–3 of Po-
trace vectorize an image into a set of contours, intuitively
smoothing out the noisy perturbations (Fig. 4a vs. b).
Therefore, vectorization is also effectively a hand-designed
smoothness prior e.g. total variation [12].
4. Experiments & Results
We evaluate VectorDefense as an input transformation
layer to help a state-of-the-art DNN classifier trained on
MNIST correctly classify AXs created by 6 state-of-the-
art gradient-based attack methods: I-FGSM, C&W L2,
PGD, DeepFool, JSMA and C&W L0.
We compare VectorDefense against two hand-designed
input transformation methods: image quilting [12], and bit-
depth reduction [42] because of the following reasons.
Image quilting was shown to be one of the most effective
input transformation techniques on natural images, i.e. Ima-
geNet [12]. Here, we implement image quilting for MNIST
(details in Sec. S7). Bit-depth reduction obtained state-of-
the-art results on MNIST, especially by converting the im-
ages into 1-bit (rather than other bit-depth levels) [42]. In
addition, comparing VectorDefense (which includes bina-
rization) vs. binarization alone enables us to highlight the
effectiveness of the entire vectorization transformation.
In addition, we also compare and contrast with a learned
input transformation method: Defense-GAN [32] to shed
more light into the pros and cons of hand-designed vs.
learned priors.
4.1. Experiment setup
Datasets and Networks The victim model is a DNN clas-
sifier from [39] trained on the MNIST dataset [20]. The
network architecture is described in Table S2.
We choose MNIST for two reasons: (1) research is still
needed to understand and defend against AXs even at sim-
ple, low-dimensional problems [1, 9], which can inform de-
fenses in a high-dimensional space (e.g. ImageNet) [9]; (2)
the handwritten digits are made of simple strokes, which
can be vectorized well by Potrace into decomposable geo-
metric primitives.
Implementation All of the attack algorithms are from the
cleverhans library [28], except C&W L0 which is from the
code released by [6]. Defense methods: Image quilting,
Defense-GAN and BPDA are from the code released by [2].
We implemented the rest of the algorithms, and the code
to reproduce our results is at https://github.com/
VishaalMK/VectorDefense.
Hyperparameters Additional hyperparaters for our exper-
iments are reported in Sec. S7.
4.2. VectorDefense in a Gray-Box Setting
We evaluate VectorDefense under the gray-box threat
model, which has strong assumptions to defend against i.e.
the attacker does have knowledge of the victim model, but
not that of the defense mechanism being employed.
Experiment For each of the 6 attack methods, we compute
1000 AXs on the target DNN from 1000 random test set im-
ages. We feed the AXs through four defense methods: (1)
Bit-depth reduction; (2) Image quilting; (3) VectorDefense;
and (4) Defense-GAN; to produce purified images, which
are then fed to the victim DNN for classification.
All hyperparameters for the 6 attacks are default from
cleverhans and the crafted AXs cause the victim DNN to
obtain at most only 0.4% accuracy (Table 1; No defense).
Results We found that VectorDefense performed similarly
to all three defense methods across four attack methods (I-
FGSM; C&W L2, DeepFool, and PGD). Table 1 reports the
accuracy scores for all 4 defenses vs. 6 attack methods.
Specifically, for C&W L0 and JSMA attacks, VectorDe-
fense substantially outperformed existing hand-designed
transformation methods (Table 1h). Qualitative compar-
isons also confirmed our quantitative result (Fig. 5c).
Compared to other attack methods, C&WL0 poses a dis-
tinct challenge for all input transformation methods by ex-
plicitly deleting input features (here, setting many pixels to
black in the image; see Fig. S10c & Fig. 1 top row). Under
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (g) (h)
Clean I-FGSM [19] C&WL2 [5] DeepFool [24] PGD [21] C&WL0 [5] JSMA [30]
No defense 99.45 0.40 0.00 0.30 0.10 0.00 0.00
Defense-GAN [32] 98.30 96.00 97.50 97.60 97.00 94.00 93.00
Bit-depth Reduction [42] 99.30 97.40 96.10 99.30 98.20 31.00 32.00
Quilting [12] 99.30 93.10 96.90 99.00 96.00 47.20 65.00
VectorDefense (this) 98.60 95.60 91.80 97.40 96.20 60.00 94.00
Table 1: Input transformation defenses against gray-box attacks. We compare our VectorDefense method against state-
of-the-art input transformation defenses on 6 attack algorithms (b–h).
such a strong attack, Defense-GAN substantially outper-
formed all hand-designed methods (Table 1g). This result
highlighted a big performance difference between a hand-
designed vs. a strong learned input transformation method
and informed our experiment in the next section.
See Sec. S8 for more qualitative results of VectorDefense
defending against each attack method considered.
4.3. Gray-Box: Budget-Aware Attack Algorithms
To study the performance of input transformations
against state-of-the-art L0 attacks, we make use of (1)
Budget-aware JSMA and (2) Budget-aware C&W L0 (de-
scribed in Sec. 2.1). These attacks explicitly take in as input
a budget—the number of pixels the algorithm is allowed to
modify.
Experiment We sweep across 6 budget settings, from 8 to
48 pixels (in increments of 8 pixels). The existence of an
AX is not guaranteed for every (original image, target la-
bel) pair, across every budget setting. Across all the bud-
get settings, we therefore evaluate the defenses on a subset
of 80 successful, targeted AXs, chosen from a set of one
thousand AXs generated via each budget-aware algorithm.
A successful AX is one that is (1) misclassified as a target
class; and (2) crafted using the exact given budget.
JSMA Results Under budget-aware JSMA, VectorDefense
outperformed bit-depth reduction and image quilting by a
large margin (≥17%; Fig. 7a). JSMA poses a challenge
to input transformation methods by setting the perturbed
pixels to the extreme positive (here, solid white; Fig. 5
heatmaps). The despeckling process is hypothesized to help
VectorDefense remove adversarial perturbations more ex-
plicitly and effectively than bit-depth reduction and quilting
(Fig. 5). However, Defense-GAN is still the most effective
in recovering from JSMA attacks.
C&W L0 Results Under budget-aware C&W L0 attack,
VectorDefense performs similarly to the existing hand-
designed input transformations across increasing budget
settings (Fig. 7b). Note that as the number of pixels per-
turbed increases, the average perturbation per pixel de-
creases (Fig. S14 heatmaps), farther away from the extreme
values. This makes it easier for all hand-designed meth-
ods to recover from, leading to (1) the increasing accuracy
scores as the budget increases (Fig. 7b); and (2) similar per-
formances across VectorDefense, bit-depth reduction and
image quilting (Fig. 7b). Overall, Defense-GAN performed
superior compared to hand-designed defenses under general
L0 attacks with extreme positive and negative perturbations
(Fig. S14b–d & Table 1g).
4.4. White-Box: Bypassing Input Transformations
Recent research showed that all state-of-the-art defenses
are not completely robust to white-box attacks where the at-
tacker has access to the defense mechanism [2]. While Vec-
torDefense is not an exception under the white-box Back-
ward Pass Differential Approximation (BPDA) attack [2],
we observed that a large amount of distortion is required to
fool the target DNN with VectorDefense.
Experiment Here we employ BPDA [2] to bypass Vec-
torDefense. Basically, BPDA has access to a black-box in-
put transformation method (here, VectorDefense) and uses
it to approximate the gradient to compute AXs. We com-
pare results of running BDPA to attack the target DNN with
no defense vs. with VectorDefense under the same experi-
mental setup. Optimization runs for 50 steps.
L2 dissimilarity often describes the average distortion
necessary to fool a classifier [2]. Here, we report the av-
erage L2 dissimilarity for the successfully crafted AXs.
Results Though the adversary ends up being successful,
VectorDefense makes the BPDA distort the images much
more vs. when there is no defense (L2 distortion of 5.30 vs.
2.97). Fig. S13 shows a qualitative comparison.
4.5. Hand-designed vs. Learned Prior
Throughout the previous results, we have qualitatively
seen the superiority of Defense-GAN—an input transfor-
mation method with a learned prior—compared to hand-
designed methods including VectorDefense. We further
compare and contrast the process of purifying AXs by these
two types of input transformation approaches.
Under strong attacks with 40-pixel perturbations,
Number of pixels perturbed by JSMA attack
(a) 8 (b) 16 (c) 24 (d) 32 (e) 40 (g) 48
Figure 5: Qualitative comparison of input transformations
on budget-aware JSMA. Clean images (clean) are added to
adversarial perturbations (row 2) to produce adversarial im-
ages (adv). Each column (a–g) corresponds to a specific
budget setting denoted on top. Rows 4–7 show the results of
VectorDefense (vec), bit-depth reduction [42] (bit), image
quilting [12] (quilt) and Defense-GAN [32] (dgan) respec-
tively. VectorDefense effectively maps adversarial images
back to the natural manifold.
Defense-GAN substantially outperformed all hand-
designed transformations (Fig. 7; yellow lines at 40).
To shed more light into this result, we qualitatively
examine cases when Defense-GAN succeeded but others
failed and showed interesting observations in Fig. 6. Here,
the images are strongly perturbed such that the AXs actu-
ally qualitatively change into the target class (Fig. 6 row 3;
digit “6” after perturbation does look like a “0”). However,
Defense-GAN prior is so strong that it pulls the image back
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Figure 6: We show 6 cases (a–f) to highlight the qualitative
difference between how hand-crafted input transformations
(VectorDefense (vec), bit-depth reduction (bit), image quilt-
ing (quilt)) purify adversarial examples (AXs) compared to
Defense-GAN (dgan). AXs were crafted by perturbing the
original images at 40 pixels via Budget-aware JSMA. While
VectorDefense transforms AXs into arguably human inter-
pretable 4, 7, 9 or 0 (vec; a–d), Defense-GAN interestingly
pulls the AXs back into 7, 1, 8, and 6 (bottom row).
into the correct class “6” (Fig. 6d). In contrast, VectorDe-
fense removes the speckles around the digit and turns the
image into a “0”—the label that may make sense to humans
but is not the original label. Similar opposite behaviors of
Defense-GAN vs. VectorDefense can be observed in other
cases (Fig. 6).
5. Discussion and Future Work
We present VectorDefense—a novel defense to AXs that
transforms a bitmap input image into the space of vector
(a) Budget-aware JSMA Attack (b) Budget-aware C&W L0 Attack
Figure 7: Classification accuracy of MNIST classifier (Table S2) on purified adversarial examples, crafted using (a) Budget-
aware JSMA algorithm and (b) Budget-aware C&W L0 algorithm and purified by four input transformations (1) VectorDe-
fense; (2) Image quilting [12]; (3) Bit-depth reduction [42]; and (4) Defense-GAN [32]. Black dotted lines show the classifier
accuracy on clean images, which serves as an upper bound to the effectiveness of a defense. A budget-setting of zero corre-
sponds to the classification accuracy on clean images. Higher is better.
graphics and back, prior to classification. We showed how
this transformation smooths out the visual artifacts created
by state-of-the-art attack algorithms.
Under strong perturbations, VectorDefense and other
hand-designed input transformation methods underper-
formed Defense-GAN, a method with a strong, learned
prior. While this result may not be too surprising, we view
VectorDefense as a stepping stone towards decomposing
images into compact, interpretable elements to solve the AX
problem. Simple use of vectorization in this work alone re-
duces effectiveness of AXs, and opens up promising exten-
sions towards more robust machine learning:
• The vector representation (SVG) could be further com-
pacted via Ramer-Peucker-Douglas algorithm [8, 31]
or constrained to compose of elements from a strict set
of geometric primitives (e.g. only straight strokes).
• Since the vector images are resolution-independent,
one could rasterize them back into much smaller-sized
images. In lower-dimensional space, it can be easier to
defend against AXs [9].
• Another extension of VectorDefense would be to learn
a generative model on this vector space.
• In high-dimensional color image space, simple image
tracing may not yield compact and interpretable ele-
ments (Sec. S6); therefore, we did not explore further
vectorizing natural images. Instead it might be inter-
esting to de-render an image into a scene graph [41],
and train a prior over the graphs [18].
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Supplementary materials for:
VectorDefense: Vectorization as a Defense to Adversarial Examples
S6. Tracing color images
Fig. S8 shows samples from SVHN and CIFAR-10
datasets traced via Potrace (each RGB channel being traced
independently). While color images can be traced via vec-
torization (Fig. S8), the output vector are often not com-
posed of simple compact, interpretable geometric primi-
tives. Therefore, we did not explore it further in this work.
SVHN CIFAR-10
Figure S8: Tracing color images using Potrace: Top row
shows test images in the bitmap space. Bottom row shows
the corresponding vector graphic outputs.
S7. Experimental Setup
VectorDefense To vectorize the input image, we used the
open-source implementation of the Potrace algorithm2. In
our experiments, we make two changes to the default po-
trace algorithm.
• We set the turn policy [33] to black, which prefers to
connect the black components in Step 1 (Sec. 3.1).
• We increased the default maximum size of removed
speckles, the despeckling value, to 5 (Sec. 3.2).
With the image converted to a scalable vector graphics
(SVG) format, we render it with the open-source Inkscape3
program, having the same width and height as the original
image.
Bit-depth reduction We reduce the images to 1-bit in our
experiments.
Image-quilting In our implementation of image quilting on
MNIST, we use a quilting patch size of 4x4 and a database
2http://potrace.sourceforge.net/
3https://inkscape.org/
of 60,000 images from the MNIST training set. The patch is
selected at random from one ofK = 10 nearest neighbours.
Defense-GAN We set the parameters of L and R to 200 and
10 respectively.
S8. Additional results by VectorDefense
We show below five figures demonstrating how Vec-
torDefense purifies AXs created by five different attack al-
gorithms: I-FGSM (Fig. 3), JSMA (Fig. S9), C&W L0
(Fig. S10), C&W L2 (Fig. S11), and DeepFool (Fig. S12).
Table S2: Neural network architecture used for the
MNIST dataset. Conv: convolutional layer, FC: fully con-
nected layer.
CONFIGURATION
Conv(64, 5, 5) + Relu
Conv(64, 5, 5) + Relu
Dropout(0.25)
FC(128) + Relu
Dropout(0.5)
FC + Softmax
Figure S9: JSMA: Given starting images (a), adversarial images are generated using JSMA (c). VectorDefense effectively
purifies the adversarial images (e). The perturbations introduced by the adversary (b) and the purification process (d) can be
obtained by subtracting (a) from (c) and (a) from (e) respectively. All images start out classified correctly with label l and are
targeted to have a label l + 1. The images were chosen as the first of their class from the MNIST test set.
Figure S10: C&W L0: Given starting images (a), adversarial images are generated using C&W L0 (c). VectorDefense
effectively purifies the adversarial images (e). The perturbations introduced by the adversary (b) and the purification process
(d) can be obtained by subtracting (a) from (c) and (a) from (e) respectively. All images start out classified correctly with
label l and are targeted to have a label l + 1. The images were chosen as the first of their class from the MNIST test set.
Figure S11: C&W L2: Given starting images (a), adversarial images are generated using C&W L2 (c). VectorDefense
effectively purifies the adversarial images (e). The perturbations introduced by the adversary (b) and the purification process
(d) can be obtained by subtracting (a) from (c) and (a) from (e) respectively. All images start out classified correctly with
label l and are targeted to have a label l + 1. The images were chosen as the first of their class from the MNIST test set.
Figure S12: DeepFool: Given starting images (a), adversarial images are generated using DeepFool (c). VectorDefense
effectively purifies the adversarial images (e). The perturbations introduced by the adversary (b) and the purification process
(d) can be obtained by subtracting (a) from (c) and (a) from (e) respectively. All images start out classified correctly with
label l and are targeted to have a label l + 1. The images were chosen as the first of their class from the MNIST test set.
Figure S13: Distortion introduced by BPDA against VectorDefense. Given starting images (a), adversarial images are gener-
ated using PGD (c) corresponding to a L2 dissimilarity of 2.97. Once VectorDefense is augmented to the image classification
pipeline, the adversarial images are then generated using PGD with BPDA (e) corresponding to a L2 dissimilarity of 5.30.
The perturbations introduced by the adversary under no defense (b) and the adversary in the presence of VectorDefense (d)
can be obtained by subtracting (a) from (c) and (a) from (e) respectively. All images start out classified correctly with label l
and are targeted to have a label l + 1. The images were chosen as the first of their class from the MNIST test set.
Number of pixels perturbed in our L0 attack
(a) 8 (b) 16 (c) 24 (d) 32 (e) 40 (g) 48
Figure S14: Qualitative comparison of input transformations on budget-aware C&W L0. This figure follows the same
conventions as in Fig. 5. Row 2: the intensities of perturbations gradually decrease as we move from the least (a) to the
greatest number of pixels (g). Hand-designed input transformation methods can only remove, but cannot fill in missing pixels
as Defense-GAN (bottom row).
